Recent Developments in the Debate concerning the Use of Foreign Law in Constitution Interpretation by Sofio, Lisa
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 30
Number 1 Fall 2006 Article 5
1-1-2006
Recent Developments in the Debate concerning
the Use of Foreign Law in Constitution
Interpretation
Lisa Sofio
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_international_comparative_law_review
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lisa Sofio, Recent Developments in the Debate concerning the Use of Foreign Law in Constitution Interpretation, 30 Hastings Int'l &
Comp. L. Rev. 131 (2006).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol30/iss1/5
Recent Developments in the Debate
Concerning the Use of Foreign Law in
Constitutional Interpretation
By LISA SOFIO*
I. Introduction
American judges now face the difficult task of interpreting the
United States Constitution, a centuries-old document, in a society
much more technologically advanced and globally interdependent
than its framers could have imagined. The difficulties of this process
become apparent as courts struggle to divine what the framers would
have thought about the use of thermal imaging devices and Fourth
Amendment rights,' or how non-traditional enemies, such as terrorist
networks, fit into the Due Process regime The challenge will only be
compounded as we move forward. When faced with a novel issue,
some members of the judiciary are increasingly taking into
consideration how other nations have reacted to a similar problem.
Recently judges who utilize this method - known as comparative
analysis - have met sharp criticism from their fellow judges and more
troublesome threats from Congress.
This note explores the use of foreign law as one tool among
many for tackling complicated modern legal dilemmas. In Part II, I
describe Congress's reaction to the use of foreign law in recently
introduced legislation and the confirmation hearings of Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito, and I speculate as to the reasons for this
reaction. Though other motives for Congress' reaction have been
advanced, the reaction appears to be largely a response to perceived
judicial activism. In Part III, I discuss whether or not Congress is
justified in limiting the sources the courts may use to answer difficult
* J.D. candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2007.
1. See United States v. Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
2. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554-99 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting;
Thomas, J., dissenting).
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
questions. Finally, in Part IV, I address some of the arguments raised
in opposition to comparative analysis and set forth affirmative
justifications for its use. I conclude that while some of the
justifications advanced in support of using foreign law are
unconvincing, foreign law is in fact a valuable tool, and judges should
not be deterred from using it.
IL. Congressional Reaction to the Judiciary's Use of
Comparative Analysis
A. Recent Activity in Both Houses of Congress
1. Legislation
In February of 2004 Representative Robert Aderholt (R-Ala.)
introduced House Resolution 3799 (the Constitution Restoration
Act).3 The Act would, among other things, prohibit judges in federal
courts from using foreign material in the interpretation and
application of the Constitution of the United States, as well as deny
federal courts jurisdiction to review the Defense of Marriage Act,
First Amendment challenges to the Pledge of Allegiance, and the
Constitution Restoration Act itself.4 Judges who find the Act
unconstitutional would be subject to impeachment Two similar bills
were introduced in the Senate by Senator Richard Shelby (R-Ala.).6
These bills died in committee in 2004 and were reintroduced in 2005.'
In March of 2004, Representative Tom Feeney (R-Fla.)
introduced House Resolution 568 (the Feeney Resolution) expressing
the sense that
Judicial determinations regarding the meaning of the laws of the
United States should not be based in whole or in part on
judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions unless
such foreign judgments, laws, or pronouncements are incorporated
into the legislative history of laws passed by the elected legislative
branches of the United States or otherwise inform an
3. H.R. Res. 3799, 108th Cong. (2004).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. S. Res. 2082, 108th Cong. (2004); S. Res. 2323, 108th Cong. (2004).
7. The Library of Congress, available at <thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d108:HR03799:@@@X> (visited September 11, 2006); H. R. Res. 1070
109th Cong. (2005); S. Res. 520 109th Cong. (2005).
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understanding of the original meaning of the laws of the United
States.8
Subsequently, the Resolution was amended to only apply to the
Constitution.9 As such, it gained the support of seventy-four sponsors
before dying in committee during the 108th Congress.0 Congressman
Feeney reintroduced similar legislation in the 109th Congress in the
form of House Resolution 97." This version currently has the support
of 84 co-sponsors. 2 In the Senate, Senator John Cornyn (R-Tex.)
introduced the nearly identical Senate Resolution 92."3
The Resolution itself merely expresses the "sense" of Congress
and is non-binding. However, statements made by Congressman
Feeney and others suggest that the implications of the Resolution are
quite serious."4 Should it pass, the Resolution would be a clear
statement as to what Congress believes constitutes "good" judicial
behavior. According to Congressman Feeney, judges who ignore this
would no longer be engaging in "good behavior" and would be
subject to impeachment.
2. Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings
While several members of Congress actively opposed utilizing
foreign sources during the recent Supreme Court confirmation
hearings, none actively took up its defense. This may be a signal that
proponents recognize the frivolousness of the issue and choose not to
warrant it with a response. Nonetheless, Congress is generally hostile
towards comparative analysis. Several senators used the two most
recent confirmation hearings of Supreme Court justices to express
this hostility and rebuke the judiciary for taking a different position.
For example, during the confirmation hearings of Chief Justice
8. H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004).
9. New York County Lawyers' Association, Report on the Reaffirmation of
American Independence Resolutions US. House Resolution 97 and Senate
Resolution 92, (March 14, 2005), available at <www.nycla.org/siteFiles/Publications/
Publications32_0.pdf> (visited October 3, 2006).
10. Id.
11. H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005).
12. The Library of Congress, available at
<thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/D?dl09:1:./temp/-bdEyAf:@@@PI/bss/dl09query.ht
ml> (visited March 9, 2006).
13. S. Res. 92, 109th Cong. (2005).
14. Tom Curry, A Flap Over Foreign Matter at the Supreme Court: House
members protest use of non-U.S. rulings in big cases, MSNBC (Mar. 11, 2004),
available at <www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4506232> (visited October 3, 2006).
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John Roberts, Senator Mike DeWine (R-Ohio) stated that in addition
to worrying about the protection of the disabled and victims of
domestic violence, many Americans worry about the Court citing
international law." Senator Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.) criticized looking
to the standards of foreign nations as "arrogant.' ' 16 Senator Cornyn
inquired as to the basis of the legitimacy of "relying" on foreign laws
that Americans had not voted on or been aware of in order to
overturn Bowers v. Hardwick.7 Senator Sam Brownback (R-Kan.)
included the Court's "interpreta[tion] of the American Constitution
on the basis of foreign and international law" in his list of examples of
the Court's straying beyond its limited role."'8
The confirmation hearings of Justice Alito had a similar tenor.
There, Senator Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.) expressed the opinion that using
foreign law undermines democratic self-government, is impractical,
and is needlessly disrespectful of the American people. 9 Because of
the Court's use of foreign law, Senator Sessions commented that
millions of Americans believe the Court is losing discipline and not
remaining faithful to the Constitution." Senator Tom Coburn (R-
Okla.) described the practice as "extremely disturbing to a lot of
Americans" and stated that he "strongly and adamantly" believed the
practice was an indication of bad behavior.2'
The purpose of a confirmation hearing is not to ascertain
Congress's view on matters such as comparative analysis. Perhaps the
senators spoke so strongly in order to elicit a response from the
nominees and induce them to take a position. However, the
legislation described above seems to belie this explanation and
confirm that congressional opposition is serious. While the comments
made at the hearings are simply opinions, they may cause even
greater reverberations throughout the judicial system than the
introduced legislation. The legislation may not be enacted, or it may
be enacted and subsequently struck down, but the these comments
15. Hearing on the Nomination of John Roberts to be Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005)
[hereinafter Roberts Hearing].
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel Alito to be Justice of the Supreme
Court Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter Alito
Hearing].
20. Id.
21. Id
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have a chilling effect on judges. Congress sent the message that
judges who use foreign law will have to answer for themselves later -
a message that may silence judges with higher aspirations. But what
is Congress so worried about?
B. Clarification of the Issue
Opponents of comparative analysis have overstated and
sensationalized the method's supposed threat.22  The Feeney
Resolution and the comments made at the confirmation hearings
leave the impression that the Court ignores well-settled precedent in
favor of foreign law and that foreign precedent is binding on the
United States Supreme Court. For example, during the Roberts
hearing, Senator Coburn explained to the nominee that a judge takes
an oath to administer justice under the Constitution and laws of the
United States and that judges only hold their office in good
behavior.23  He then asked, "Is relying on foreign precedent and
selecting and choosing a foreign precedent.., good behavior?" and
inquired as to whether he could count on Justice Roberts to ignore
foreign precedent.24
Such characterizations wrongly presuppose that justices ignore
well-settled American law in favor of a foreign opinion and that
foreign cases are binding on American courts. "Precedent" is a term
of art that means "a decided case that furnishes a basis for
determining later cases involving similar facts or issues." '25 When a
case is precedential authority, courts must apply the doctrine of stare
decisis. Referring to the opinions of other courts is different from
being bound by them. It is a common practice for state courts to refer
to and cite the opinions of other states when there is a dearth of case
law on a particular issue in that state. Lower federal courts also look
to what positions their sister courts have taken on issues and
sometimes cite to them. These courts do not believe that sister court
decisions are binding precedent, but merely acknowledge that these
decisions are persuasive. Similarly, judges who cite to foreign
22. Some advocates of the practice have also contributed to the
sensationalization of the threat by describing the Court in Lawrence as "directly
citing to decisions of the European Court of Human Rights." See e.g. Rex D.
Glensey, Which Countries Count?" Lawrence v. Texas and the Selection of Foreign
Persuasive Authority, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 357, 358 (2005).
23. Roberts Hearing, supra note 15.
24. Id,
25. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1214 (8th ed. 2004).
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opinions do not believe that these decisions are binding precedent on
the United States Supreme Court. This is not to suggest that foreign
courts are the "sister courts" of the United States Supreme Court, but
merely to illustrate the difference between citing an opinion and
being bound by it. Some opponents of comparativism seem to be
blurring the distinction between binding and precedential authority in
order to garner support; others may simply fear that this distinction
will dissolve.26
Upon further clarification from Justice Roberts that judges who
use foreign law are not bound by it, Senator Coburn continued to
suggest that using foreign law violates the judicial oath to administer
justice under the Constitution and the laws of the United States, and
that such a violation constitutes bad behavior and grounds for
removal.27 Roberts reasonably replied that while he did not agree
with using comparative analysis, he did not interpret the practice as
acting in bad faith or violating the oath.28 Not satisfied, Senator
Coburn continued on, fixated on the words "laws of the United
States."
The exchange between Coburn and Roberts reveals a disconnect
between what comparative analysis really is and how Congress sees it.
Congress frames the choice as one between following foreign law and
following American law. The real issue is whether using foreign legal
sources offends the Constitution if the sources help interpret the
Constitution and laws of the United States. Members of Congress
who vehemently oppose comparative analysis wrongly assume that
judges begin with foreign law and administer justice accordingly.
Instead, judges begin with a provision of the Constitution or other law
and look to the laws of other nations to help understand its meaning
or consequences in appropriate circumstances. The factors
motivating the Congressional response help explain whether this is a
genuine misunderstanding or an attempt to galvanize the public.
C. Reasons for This Reaction
1. Suggested Reasons
Scholars and members of Congress have advanced various
theories to explain the attitude reflected in the Feeney Resolution.
26. I address this concern below at Part III. B. 2.
27. Id
28. Id
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Congress has offered the following explanations: a "chief cause" of
the American Revolution was King George's subjection of Americans
to foreign law; the Court's "reliance" on foreign law in Lawrence v.
Texas and other recent decisions; the need for Americans to live their
lives within clear boundaries; and the threat to sovereignty,
separation of powers, and treaty-making authority posed by
"reliance" on foreign judgments.29 Others suggest that the reaction is
a political power play aimed at reducing the influence of liberal
judges." This seems plausible considering that 82 Republican
Representatives and only two Democrats back the current version of
the Resolution, and that all of the Senators who voiced their
opposition at the confirmation hearings were Republicans." While
Congress may be reacting to to the liberal justices who cite foreign
law, Professor Vicki Jackson of Georgetown University Law Center
testified before Congress that the justices who have referred to
foreign legal sources are of divergent political ideologies.
Yet another theory is that the Congressional backlash is part of
an anti-gay agenda. The preamble to the Feeney Resolution explains
that one of the reasons for Congress' "sense" is the Court's use of
foreign law in Lawrence v. Texas, a case that invalidated a Texas anti-
sodomy statute.3 Congress's decision to single out Lawrence seems
suspicious because the Court in Lawrence departed from Bowers v.
Hardwick- an earlier case upholding the anti-sodomy law which also
cited foreign law. Some commentators accuse members of Congress
of disguising their distasteful prejudices against homosexuals behind
the much less controversial debate over comparative analysis.34 But
this explanation is not well-founded.35
29. H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005); S. Res.
92, 109th Cong. (2005).
30. Marc 0. DeGirolami, Congressional Threats of Removal Against Federal
Judges, 10 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 111, 114 (2005).
31. The Library of Congress, supra note 7. Democrats Jim Marshall and Mike
McIntyre support the Feeney Resolution. The Library of Congress, available at
<thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d09:HE00097:@@@P> (visited September 25,
2006).
32. Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the Interpretation of American
Law' Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Comm. on the H.
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 35-39 (2004) [hereinafter Foreign Judgments Hearing]
(statement of Professor Vicki C. Jackson, Georgetown University Law Center).
33. H.R. Res. 568 108th Cong. (2004).
34. See e.g. Glensey, supra note 22, at 363.
35. Similar accusations directed toward Justice Scalia are equally unsupportable.
It is unfair to accuse Justice Scalia of selective opposition or of critiquing comparative
2006]
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To say that Feeney and his colleagues oppose comparative
analysis because it allows them to disguise their secret aversion to
homosexuals' rights obfuscates the real reason for their resistance.
Aversion to homosexuals' rights is not so unpopular in Congress that
its members would have to hide behind an acceptable reason for
disliking it.36 Additionally, the members who exhibit ambivalence on
comparative analysis do so in a principled manner: they favor judges
using foreign law when Congress says they may, as opposed to
favoring the use of foreign law only when it achieves the desired
political result. Opponents of comparative analysis believe that it is
acceptable for members of Congress to look to what other countries
do, but not the judiciary. To them, the comparative analysis debate is
truly about judicial activism, not gay rights.37
2. Probable Reason and its Legitimacy
The backlash against the use of foreign law is best explained as
part of a bigger debate concerning judicial activism, as it is part of a
recent trend of weakening the judicial branch. Congress has
communicated its concern about an overactive judiciary by removing
discretionary sentencing, introducing several jurisdiction stripping
bills, and reducing the salaries of federal. judges.38 Members of
Congress worry that judges will invoke foreign laws as additional
constraints on Congress' ability to pass laws which individual judges
do not approve of, but that are otherwise constitutional. While this
fear of an over active judiciary is rational, it seems that judges who
analysis in a results-oriented way. Justice Scalia expressed discomfort with foreign
references long before Lawrence because he does not believe they comport with his
originalist interpretation of the Constitution.
36. See H.R. Res. 1100, 109th Cong. (2006) (denying federal courts the ability to
interpret or invalidate the Defense of Marriage Act); Defense of Marriage Act, 1
U.S.C. § 7 (2005) (defining marriage as between a man and a woman); Defense of
Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2005) (not requiring any state to recognize same
sex marriages performed in other states); H.R. Res. 734, 108th Cong. (2004)
(providing for consideration to limit federal court jurisdiction on questions under the
Defense of Marriage Act); S. Res. 275,108th Cong. (2003) (resolving to take whatever
steps necessary to affirm that marriage consists of the union of a man and a woman);
H.R. Res. 3313, 108th Cong. (2003) (limiting federal court jurisdiction over questions
under the Defense of Marriage Act).
37. Donald E. Childress III recognizes the debate as one not about
comparativism as such, but about the role of the judiciary within American
democracy in his Note, Using Comparative Constitutional Law to Resolve Domestic
Federal Ouestions, 53 DUKE L.J. 193, 196 (2003).
38. 150 Cong. Rec. E1687-01 (2004) (statement of J. John Conyers).
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modestly add as much objective information as possible should
ameliorate Congress' fear that judges are acting out of ideological
motivation, not compound it. Still, opponents of comparative analysis
largely perceive the use of foreign law as an illegitimate power grab,
rather than a good faith attempt to further the understanding of the
Constitution.
Representative Feeney and others worry that a judge using
comparative analysis will have no objective criteria for deciding which
foreign laws are appropriate for citation and therefore will rely
selectively on the foreign laws that advance her position.3 9 While the
choice of countries to cite is a valid concern, there are two reasons
why this should not prevent judges from engaging in comparative
analysis. First, a good judge will not simply choose countries that
favor her ruling.' Any interpretive aid is susceptible to selective use.
Judges may cite only the portions of legislative history, historical data,
or international precedents that they find helpful, but this does not
mean these tools should be off limits to the judiciary. Second, the
Court may eventually develop a mechanism for selecting countries
whose practices are appropriate for review. In the past the Court has
developed standards for non-binding persuasive sources, such as
relying on a majority of state legislatures or the federal circuit courts.
There is no reason to assume the Court could not come up with a
structured way of utilizing foreign resources as well. Legal scholars
have already advanced proposals that may aid the Court in this
endeavor.4 One such proposal begins with the proposition that all
countries are not created equal and then offers suggestions for
composing a workable list of which countries are worthy of
comparison.42
39. H.R. Res. 568 108th Cong. (2004) ("Whereas Americans should not have to
look for guidance on how to live their lives from the often contradictory decisions of
any hundreds of other foreign organizations.").
40. Justices Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer, U.S. Association of
Constitutional Law Discussion at American University Washington College of the
Law: Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions (January 13, 2005)
(transcript available at <www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1352357/posts> (visited
October 3, 2006) [hereinafter Scalia-Breyer Debate].
41. See, e.g., Glensey, supra note 22; Edward Lee, The New Canon: Using or
Misuing Foreign Law to Decide Domestic Intellectual Property Claims, 46 HARVARD
INT'L L.J. 1, 29-62 (2005). Judge Calabrisi of the Second Circuit also seems to be
developing a method of selection. In United States v. Then, he wrote of the virtues
of looking to "our constitutional offspring" because "[wjise parents do not hesitate to
learn from their children." 56 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi J., concurring).
42. Glensey, supra note 22, at 401-439.
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This proposal may also assuage another fear members of
Congress have identified: that using foreign references undermines
U.S. sovereignty. 3  Comparative analysis does not threaten
sovereignty because the courts retain the power to decide when to use
this method and which countries are useful in the process.' However,
some members of Congress will most likely continue to attack
comparative analysis even though the courts retain this power.
III. Appropriateness of Congress' Position
During the confirmation hearings, Congress wanted Justice
Roberts to promise not to use foreign sources or characterize the
Court's method of reasoning as superior to that of Congress.45
Congress' request was in response to the Court's denigration of
congressional methods of reasoning in cases such as Morrison v.
Lopez 46 and the relatively recent surge in overturned legislation.47
Congress' rationale is understandable on some level: Congress will
involve itself less in the methods of interpretation the courts use if the
judiciary respects Congress' legislative reasoning. However, further
examination reveals that Congress' request is unreasonable and
probably unconstitutional. The courts may properly criticize a
method of reasoning that produces unconstitutional legislation
because the courts are charged with upholding the Constitution.
When Congress exhorts the Court to avoid questioning the
legislature's methods of reasoning, it is asking the Court to ignore a
Constitutional mandate. 8 By contrast, the Court may ask Congress
not to question its methods of reasoning because it is merely
preserving the separation of powers mandated by the Constitution.9
43. H.R. Res. 568 108th Cong. (2004).
44. Glensey, supra note 22, at 359.
45. Roberts Hearing, supra note 15.
46. Morrison v. Lopez, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000) ("In these cases, Congress'
findings are substantially weakened by the fact that they rely so heavily on a method
of reasoning that we have already rejected as unworkable if we are to maintain the
Constitution's enumeration of powers.").
47. Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 257, 317
(2005).
48. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States ... ").
49. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish.").
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Two sections of the Constitution expressly provide for
Congressional control over the judiciary.0 Article Three, Section
One establishes a Supreme Court, but gives Congress the power to
create lower federal courts.51 Article Three, Section Two subjects the
Supreme Court to such exceptions and regulations as Congress shall
make.52 In United States v. Klein, the Court elaborated on the
contours of Congress' constitutional power over the judiciary. The
Court held that Congress unconstitutionally invades on the powers of
the judicial branch when Congress proscribes rules of decisions under
the auspices of these clauses.53 Moreover, it has been the prerogative
of the judiciary to decide what the Constitution means since Marbury
v. Madison.' An act of Congress passed dictating how judges may
interpret the Constitution would therefore be unconstitutional, and
many predict that the first court to review such an act would strike it
down."
Not everyone believes that congressional involvement in the
debate over methods of interpretation is improper. Commentator
Marc DeGirolami argues that the ambiguity of the "good behavior"
standard allows the legislature to define the standard's parameters .
He posits that Congressional threats of removal do not violate the
separation of powers because one branch (the legislature) is acting as
a check on the other (the judiciary).5 But DeGirolami's assertion is
only true if Congress does not overstep its checking power.
DiGirolami's theory relies on the assertion that "the legislature's
power of job termination over the judiciary threatens to trump all
other divisions of power between those two branches."5 8  This is
incorrect because, while the legislature does have the power to
terminate the jobs of individual judges, it does not have the power to
50. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
51. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
52. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
53. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 146 (1871).
54. Marbury v. Madison, 5. U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
55. See, e.g., Foreign Judgments Hearing, supra note 32; Michael C. Dorf, The
Use of Foreign Law in American Constitutional Interpretation: A Revealing
Colloquy Between Justices Scalia and Breyer, Findlaw.com (Jan. 19, 2005), available
at <writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20050119.html> (visited October 3, 2006); Laura E.
Little, Transnational Guidance in Terrorism Cases, 38 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 1, 1
(2006); New York County Lawyers' Association, supra note 9.
56. DeGirolami, supra note 30, at 118.
57. Id at 145.
58. Id.
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terminate the judiciary as a whole. 9 Congress oversteps its power to
check the judiciary when its threats of removal prevent the judiciary
from using tools which are not pre-approved by Congress.
The logic behind the theory that Congress can dictate judicial
interpretation of the Constitution is troubling. If Congress had this
power, it could just as easily require comparative analysis as prohibit
the practice. Or Congress could require the judiciary to interpret the
Constitution according to California Supreme Court authority. While
a court could arrive at the same conclusions on its own accord, this is
the prerogative of the judiciary.
The war on terror presents a challenge that is unique to our
country's history. In this context, it is unwise to limit the courts to the
views of men who wrote hundreds of years before this phenomenon
arose. A better approach would be to consult the laws of other
nations that have experienced terrorism in their recent past. Such
countries have already debated how to balance civil liberties with
national security concerns when fighting terrorism. Senator Orrin
Hatch (R-Utah) instead suggests that the Court grant leniency to the
executive and legislative branches as they come to grips with this new
problem. 6° Specifically, he asked the Court to be open minded about
new policies and procedures challenged under Miranda v. Arizona
and the Sixth Amendment.61 Hatch seems to suggest that the
judiciary should simply trust Congress to pass Constitutional laws
when confronted with issues not contemplated by the Framers.
Rather than trusting the other branches' sense of the Constitution on
historically unique issues, the Court should have flexibility in the
tools it uses to approach these issues. This will provide more
protection for the people and uphold the separation of powers.
IV. Affirmative Justifications for Comparative Analysis
Professor Alford argues that the aim of a constitutional theory of
interpretation is to identify a method that others are willing to
accept.62 If Alford's opinion is correct, comparative analysis will be
less susceptible to Congressional attack if affirmative reasons for its
59. The Constitution establishes a judicial branch. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
60. Alito Hearing, supra note 19.
61. Id
62. Roger F. Alford, Roper v. Simmons and Our Constitution in International
Equipoise, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1, 26-27 (2005) (quoting Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to
Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L. REV. 535, 572 (1999)).
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use exist. This section explores how comparative analysis can help
judges interpret the Constitution in an evolving world.
A. Proposed Justifications for Comparative Analysis
Certainly among academics, and even among the justices who
utilize comparative analysis, there is no settled consensus on why
comparative analysis is used. Professor Kersch outlined three
categories that most of the rationales for the practice fall into: the first
is founded on a sense of moral universalism; the second is what he
defines as "appeals to the refinement of technical and administrative
competence" or the pragmatic approach; and the third is based on a
desire for diplomatic judicial globalization.63 Professor Kersch
believes the categories should be considered in aggregate and does
not approve of defending comparativism on one ground while
renouncing it on another.64 However, the dissimilarity of the three
categories requires that they be considered separately. While the
pragmatic approach is a legitimate justification for comparative
analysis, the moral universalism and diplomatic judicial globalization
rationales are subject to various criticisms. Most importantly, these
rationales do not sufficiently explain why foreign law is useful to
interpreting the Constitution. Judges who continue to use these
rationales will have difficulty persuading critics of comparative
analysis to accept its use.
1. The Moral Universalism Theory
The moral universalism theory is based on the idea that certain
civil rights issues intrinsically transcend borders.65 Central to this
theory are the ideas that definable moral standards exist, a system is
not truly just until it meets these moral standards, and these standards
can be ascertained by looking at other countries. For example,
proponents of moral universalism defend the comparative references
in Miranda v. Arizona because they define a threshold of rights from
which the government may depart upward but not downward. 6
Justice O'Connor, who seems to advocate moral universalism, stated
63. Ken I. Kersch, The New Legal Transnationalism, the Globalized Judiciary,
and the Rule of Law, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 345, 353 (2005); see also
Alford, supra note 62, at 2-3; Rex D. Glensey, Quasi-Global Social Norms, 38 CONN.
L. REV. 79, 114-20 (2005).
64. Id.
65. Glensey, supra note 22, at 369.
66. Id. at 370.
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in Roper v. Simmons, "[O]ur Nation's evolving understanding of
human dignity certainly is neither wholly isolated from, nor
inherently at odds with, the prevailing values in other countries.,
67
Other proponents of this school of thought argue that some legal
questions are "human" questions with "human" answers found
outside a particular national judiciary."' However, this principle does
not help an American judge interpret the Constitution because no
guiding principle exists to help determine which questions are
"human" and which countries provide the right answers.
Moral universalism may also provoke critics such as Justice
Scalia, who argues, "[E]qually irrelevant are the practices of the
world community whose notions of justice (thankfully) are not always
those of our people" and also the sentiment in Congress that they are
bound by laws other than those of the United States.69 While foreign
law may be "equally irrelevant" for purposes of determining a moral
threshold of rights, comparative analysis is relevant for practical
purposes (discussed below at section B).
2. The Diplomatic Judicial Globalization Argument
The theory of diplomatic judicial globalization is similarly
unconvincing and may violate the separation of powers principle by
placing the judiciary in conflict with the executive branch. This
theory justifies comparative analysis as a means of creating a
transnational judiciary. Justice O'Connor appears to support
diplomatic judicial globalization because she stated that citing foreign
law enriches decisions of this country and "may create that all-
important good impression. ,70 Justice Breyer has also indicated
support for this theory, even though he usually advocates the
pragmatic approach.7'  He argued that this diplomatic judicial
globalization gives "a leg up" to judiciaries struggling for
independence in nascent democracies. 2 According to Breyer, citing
fledgling judiciaries will bolster their legitimacy among their people,
even if the courts are merely cited as "interesting examples., 73 Breyer
67. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 605 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
68. Scalia-Breyer Debate, supra note 40.
69. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 347-348 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70. Curry, supra note 14.
71. Scalia-Breyer Debate, supra note 40.
72. Id.
73. Id Professor Little subscribes to a related rationale. While touting the
pragmatic benefits of foreign sources, she believes that the ultimate goal of their use
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essentially advocates citing foreign opinions as a means of spreading
democracy abroad.
There are two problems with this approach. Primarily, it is not
the American judiciary's duty to encourage democracies abroad. The
duty of the judiciary is to administer the laws of the Unietd States.
Space in an opinion devoted to the purpose of affecting the rule of
law abroad is space not devoted to administering laws here. Even
devoting just a few lines in an opinion for "interesting examples" is
inappropriate if the motive is improper, such as to influence foreign
politics.
Moreover, a judge who writes an opinion in order to incite an
international reaction encroaches on the executive's constitutional
power to dictate foreign policy." Using comparative analysis in order
to further diplomatic judicial globalization should therefore be
avoided because it violates the separation of powers principle.
However, using comparative analysis solely for its practical value
avoids the dangers presented by the diplomatic judicial globalization
theory.
B. A Valid Justification: The Pragmatic Approach
1. Practical Benefits of the Pragmatic Approach
Because law is connected to life, judges should look to the
consequences of decisions, including the effect of decisions on the
contemporary social, industrial, and political conditions of the
community.75 The proposition that the real world impact of judicial
action matters is a unifying principle that both liberals and
conservatives in Congress and the judiciary can agree upon. In fact,
this principle was the only thing that liberal Senator Edward Kennedy
(D-Mass.) and conservative Justice Roberts agreed upon during his
confirmation hearings.76 If the consequences of a decision matter,
then it is a judge's duty to thoughtfully consider the effects of
deciding a case a certain way. Comparative analysis can be most
useful at this point in the decision making process. Rather than
is the defeat of terrorism. According to Little, foreign law can aid this end by
increasing the legitimacy of the United States abroad, thereby gaining cooperation of
foreign nations in the war on terror. Little, supra note 55, at 29.
74. U.S. CONST. art. I.
75. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 18 (Knopf 2005).
76. Roberts Hearing, supra note 15.
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speculating on possible consequences, a judge can consider empirical
evidence from foreign nations in order to develop a more accurate
sense of what the consequences of her decision will be. She is still
free to take into account relevant differences in authority that make
some sources more or less valuable than others.
In a debate with Justice Scalia, Justice Breyer explained how
comparative analysis helps him predict the consequences of his
decisions.7 For example, when Breyer was reviewing a case involving
the Establishment Clause and school vouchers, he was uncertain how
much dissension this issue would cause in society.78 Breyer looked to
the experiences of Britain and France, which both subsidize private
religious schools, to help predict how Americans would react to
subsidies for religious schools here. While Americans are different
from the French and British, their experiences still have predictive
value to an American judge speculating on how his decision will
affect society.
Scalia's dissent in Lawrence v. Texas provides another example
of how comparative analysis provides predictive value to a judge
contemplating the consequences of a decision. In his dissent, Scalia
refers to what has come to be known as the "Parade of Horrors, 79 - a
litany of evils that Scalia feared would result from striking down anti-
sodomy laws. He feared that once the door was opened to legalized
homosexuality, the government would be unable to regulate bigamy,
same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery,
fornication, bestiality, and obscenity.80 While Scalia's general concern
for consequences is fair and responsible, even the most cursory
review of the experiences of other nations would help determine
whether striking down anti-sodomy laws would open the Pandora's
Box as he feared. Instead, Scalia relied on bare speculation and
criticized foreign law when comparative analysis could have either
justified or assuaged the fears expressed.
Comparative analysis can also aid courts as they continue to
develop jurisprudence in the realm of terrorism. Foreign and
international law is particularly appropriate for terrorism cases
because they presents novel challenges, little relevant American case
77. Scalia-Breyer Debate, supra note 40.
78. Id.
79. Gretchen Van Ness, The Inevitability of Gay Marriage, 38 NEw ENG. L. REV.
563, 565 (2004) (discussing the potential effects of legalizing gay marriage).
80. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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law exists, and other countries have struggled with the same issues.
For example, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld ' and other "detainee" cases, 2
the Court struggled to balance the goals of preserving civil liberties
and maintaining national security.83 In a highly criticized opinion, the
Court balanced these goals by applying the Matthews v. Elridge
balancing test, which was developed to evaluate the administration of
disability benefits.84 One commentator suggests that the Court would
have reached a more accurate and workable result if it had consulted
foreign and international materials.85 Congress may continue to insist
that "[olur country has evolved to where there is enough precedent
and enough corpus juris which a court can use to interpret and
determine whether [a law is Constitutional], '  but Hamdi suggests
otherwise. Terrorism is an international problem and other countries
have labored over how best to fight it while still guaranteeing civil
liberties. Foreign experiences with anti-terrorism laws may be more
useful in cases like Hamdithan domestic disability law.
While Hamdi dealt with the due process rights of enemy
combatants,"' the American public is also concerned with the use of
torture and electronic surveillance in the war on terror. When these
issues reach the courts, the judiciary can look to the opinion handed
down by Britain's highest court pertaining to the admissibility of
evidence obtained through torture."M  In that case, the Lords
considered the legality of detaining ten suspects under an anti-
terrorism law passed as a response to September 11. Although the
81. Hamdi. supra note 2.
82. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S.
367 (2004).
83. Laura E. Little, supra note 55.
84. Id. at 11.
85. Id at 10.
86. House Resolution on the Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the
Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States. H.R. Res. 79, 109th Cong.
(2005); Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary (July 19, 2005) (statement of Rep. Chabot). As evidence that such
sweeping statements about our country's democratic evolution should be cautioned,
it is interesting to note one aspect of Justice Breyer's defense of comparative analysis.
According to him, the countries he looks to are worthy of comparison for being past
basic issues such as "should we stop torture?" Scalia-Breyer Debate, supra note 40.
Given our own nations recent struggle with this issue, perhaps we are not as far
ahead of other nations in the democratic evolution as is often perceived.
87. Hamdi, supra note 2.
88. A and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (No 2), [2005]
A.C. 71 (H.L.), (appeal taken from Court of Appeal Civil Division) (U.K.); 2005
W.L. 1249.
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Home Department detained the suspects in accordance with the
Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act of 1997 - a piece of
legislation designed to "reconcile the competing demands of
procedural fairness and national security" - some of the evidence
against the detainees may have been obtained through torture
committed by other countries.89 Before vociferously denying the
admissibility of any evidence obtained through torture, the House of
Lords considered English common law, public international law, and
the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as foreign law
including nine American decisions. 90 Arguments also referred to
thirteen other American decisions. 91
This British decision may be particularly useful to American
courts because it cites American cases and common law principles
and examines concerns (national security and civil rights) that
Americans also struggle to balance. Instead of struggling to balance
these concerns based on the limited relevant American case law, as
the Court did in Hamdi, the Court could consider the British case's
insightful analysis and how the decision ultimately affects Britain's
ability to maintain national security.
The examples above illustrate the practical ways in which
comparative analysis can aid a judge considering the consequences of
a difficult decision. Some opponents concede this value and have no
problem with judges researching and considering foreign law, but
argue against including the results of this research in judicial opinions.
2. Possible Dangers of the Pragmatic Approach Considered
In a recent debate, Justice Scalia admonished Justice Breyer to
read about foreign law, but not write about it.9 Like Scalia, many
appreciate the advantages of comparative analysis but are not
convinced that the advantages outweigh the danger that frequently
cited foreign law may become binding. This skepticism seems
unwarranted because judges commonly and uncontroversially cite
sources such as law review articles for their empirical value. Court
opinions even cite Lewis Carroll and other pop culture sources that
are certainly less reliable than foreign opinions, yet Congress does not
89. Id. at 1256-57.
90. Id. at 1250-79.
91. Id. at 1252-56.
92. Scalia-Breyer Debate, supra note 40.
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protest.93 Justice Scalia even cited Hippocrates in a recent case,
Gonzales v. Oregon,94 without arousing fear that the United States
would be bound by the Hippocratic Oath. One of the Court's most
revered decisions, Brown v. Board of Education, relies extensively on
sociological studies.9  Perhaps these sources are not protested
because they have much less authoritative legitimacy than foreign
opinions and there is no threat that they will slip into the precedential
hierarchy. However, this explanation does not clarify why critics of
comparative analysis do not see authoritatively legitimate sources
such as state or circuit court opinions as threats to American
jurisprudence.
Some explain this inconsistency as a facet of provincialism and
xenophobia,96  arguing that Congress is not reacting to the
"precedent," but to the "foreign." '  Another explanation may be
that, unlike a court citing foreign sources, a court citing a
nontraditional domestic source does so purely for its empirical value.
However, there is an important reason to include a foreign law in
an opinion if that law was significant in the analysis. As a response to
Scalia's admonishment to read about foreign law, but not write about
it, Breyer replied that an opinion should be as transparent as
possible.9 If a foreign opinion was significant to a judge's thought
process, it may help explain the opinion and should be included. The
public and Congress both benefit when courts accurately explain how
they reached their decision. As Justice Brandeis said, "Sunlight is
said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient
policeman. '9 Citizens can be more active participants in democracy
when they understand how courts reach decisions. Likewise,
93. No less than four Supreme Court cases directly cite to the works of Lewis
Carroll. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston,
515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 410 (1991); Columbus Bd.
of Ed. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 514 n.18 (1979); Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,
437 U.S. 153, 174 n.18 (1978).
94. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 932 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
95. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
96. See DeGirolami, supra note 30, at 132.
97. Another fact to consider is that the Feeney Resolution approves of the use of
foreign law when foreign law is referenced in the judicial history. This further
illustrates the inter-branch nature of the debate. Congress does not object to foreign
precedent per se, but only when it has not approved of it.
98. Scalia-Breyer Debate, supra note 40.
99. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 92 (National Home Library
Foundation ed. 1933).
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Congress can write better laws if it has a clear sense of how the
judiciary will review those laws. Furthermore, a transparent opinion
will be less susceptible to charges of judicial activism because
Congress will be able to see that it is a product of objective reasoning
rather than individual preference.
V. Conclusion
In Palko v. Connecticut, the Court referred to the Constitution as
emanating values that are the "the very essence of a scheme of
ordered liberty, 'm a characterization with which even some of the
most outspoken critics of comparative analysis agree.'"' Since the
United States is not the only place where ordered liberty exists, the
phrase "essence of a scheme of ordered liberty" - like "cruel and
unusual punishment," "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"
and "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society" - begs comparison. Judges who refer to foreign law
in applying these terms are still administering the Constitution and
laws of the United States. But these judges recognize that certain
provisions do not exist in a bubble. Some limit their acceptance of
comparative analysis to these instances where particular provisions
invite it. However, comparative analysis should not be limited as
such if the consequences of judicial decisions matter at all. It is
elementary that a more informed decision-making process will
produce better laws. While globalization has created some of the
most difficult problems of this century, such as international
terrorism, it can also produce important solutions if the judiciary
remains open-minded to the empirical wisdom foreign law has to
offer.
100. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
101. Alito Hearing, supra note 19.
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